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THE NATURE AND NECESSITY OF 
SCIENTIFIC JUDGMENT 
Douglas L. Weed, M.D., Ph.D.∗ 
“Judgment is a utensil proper for all subjects and will 
have an oar in everything.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
Judgment sits at the center of the intersection where science, 
law, and policy meet. It is regularly invoked when scientific 
evidence is used to make a claim about disease causation in the 
courts2 or in regulatory risk assessment.3 Judgment also features 
                                                          
∗ Chief, Office of Preventive Oncology, and Director, Cancer Prevention 
Fellowship Program, at the National Cancer Institute; M.D. Ohio State 
University, Ph.D. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. For many 
helpful comments and suggestions, the author is grateful to Dr. Joe Cecil at 
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and Dr. Robert McKeown at the University of South Carolina. 
1 8 MICHEL DE MONTAIGNE, Of Democritus and Heraclitus, in THE 
COMPLETE WORKS OF MICHEL DE MONTAIGNE 266, 266-68 (Alfred P Knopf 
ed. Donald M. Frame Trans. 2003). 
2 See CARL F. CRANOR, TOXIC TORTS: SCIENCE, LAW, AND THE 
POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 142 (2006).  “Implicit in scientific inference is the 
role of professional judgment.” Cranor notes that causal inferences made by 
experts in toxic tort litigation involve judgment at several steps: reviewing, 
selecting and weighing the relevant scientific data (evidence), incorporating 
their background understanding of the underlying biology (and/or toxicology), 
evaluating the different possible explanations (e.g. noncausal explanations) in 
light of all the evidence, and finally, making a statement about the most 
likely explanation for the available evidence. See also Jerome P. Kassirer & 
Joe S. Cecil, Inconsistency in Evidentiary Standards for Medical Testimony: 
Disorder in the Courts, 288 JAMA, 1382, 1382-87 (2002). “In the final 
analysis, assessment of evidence and causal inferences (in the courts) depend 
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prominently when scientific evidence is used to support the need 
for a public health intervention4 or a medical treatment.5 From 
                                                          
on accumulating all potentially relevant evidence and making a subjective 
judgment about the strength of the evidence.” See also Michael D. Green, 
Michal Freedman & Leon Gordis, Reference Guide on Epidemiology in 
Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence 375, Federal Judicial Center (2000) 
(“Drawing causal inferences after finding an association and considering these 
factors (i.e. causal guidelines based on Hill’s so-called causal criteria) 
requires judgment and searching analysis. . . .”). 
3 See, e.g., Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, United States 
Environmental Protection Agency, 2-49-51 (2005). In the first stage of the 
process of regulatory risk assessment—often referred to as hazard 
identification—the final summary statement is called the “weight of evidence 
narrative” within which the committee summarizes its decision regarding the 
carcinogenicity of a chemical in terms of one of the following descriptors: 
“carcinogenic to humans,” “likely to be carcinogenic to humans,” 
“suggestive evidence of carcinogenic potential,” “inadequate information to 
assess carcinogenic potential,” or “not likely to be carcinogenic to humans.” 
As the guidelines clearly state: “choosing a descriptor is a matter of judgment 
and cannot be reduced to a formula.” (emphasis added). See also Preamble, 
International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) Monograph on the 
Evaluation of Carcinogenic Risks to Humans, World Health Organization 
International Agency for Research on Cancer, 3 (2006) (“The evaluations of 
IARC Working Groups are scientific, qualitative judgments on the evidence 
for and against carcinogenicity provided by the available data.”) (emphasis 
added). See also H. OTWAY, H. & D. VON WINTERFELDT, EXPERT 
JUDGMENT IN RISK ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT: PROCESS, CONTEXT, AND 
PITFALLS, RISK ANALYSIS 92 (1992) (“The use of formal expert judgment in 
policy arenas (involving the selection and evaluation of new and alternative 
technologies) is likely to increase.”) (emphasis added). 
4 Causal inferences in epidemiology and other public health disciplines 
have relied upon “aides” to judgment (see J.J. Schlesselman, “Proof” of 
Cause and Effect in Epidemiologic Studies: Criteria for Judgment, 16 
PREVENTIVE MEDICINE 195, 195-210 (1987)), often referred to as “criteria,” 
that is, considerations that assist judgments about disease causation (see M. 
SUSSER, CAUSAL THINKING IN THE HEALTH SCIENCES (1973); M. Susser, 
Judgment and Causal Inferences: Criteria in Epidemiologic Studies, 105 AM. 
J. OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 701, 701-15 (1977)), or that serve as the centerpiece of 
a mixed quantitative and qualitative methodology within which judgment 
plays a prominent role (see D.L. Weed & L.S. Gorelic, The Practice of 
Causal Inference in Cancer Epidemiology, 5 CANCER EPIDEMIOLOGY, 
BIOMARKERS & PREVENTION 303, 303-11 (1996)). As Weed and Gorelic 
note, “At its core, causal inference (in epidemiology) is a complex matter of 
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every corner of the complex crossroads of science and law and 
policy, the judgment of scientific experts is now hailed; it is 
“essential and irreducible,”6 “required,”7 a “virtue.”8 
                                                          
reasoned judgment . . .” Id. at 308. These so-called criteria typically include: 
consistency, strength, biologic gradient (dose-response), temporality, 
experimental evidence, biological plausibility, coherence, specificity, and 
analogy. See Austin Bradford Hill, The Environment and Disease: 
Association or Causation? 58 PROC. ROY. SOC. MED. 295, 295-300 (1965). 
For a discussion of these criteria in the context of general causation, see D.L. 
Weed, Causation: An Epidemiological Perspective, 12 J. L. & POL’Y 43, 43-
53 (2003). For a historical overview of causal inference in epidemiology and 
its application to the prevention of cancer, see D.L. Weed, Causal and 
Preventive Inference in CANCER PREVENTION AND CONTROL 285, 285-302 
(Greenwald, Kramer & Weed, eds. 1995). Causal inferences are important 
components of the process of making public health recommendations 
regarding preventive interventions. 
5 For therapeutic decision making, clinical judgment typically teams up 
with scientific evidence. E.g., Cynthia D. Mulrow & Kathleen N. Lohr, 
Proof and Policy from Medical Research Evidence, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y 
& L. 249, 249-66 (2001) (“When judging the benefits and harms of health 
care and predicting patient prognosis, clinicians, researchers, and others must 
consider many types of evidence.”). However, Edmund D. Pellegrino points 
out that there are also other components of clinical judgment: language, 
rhetoric, critical thinking and logic, as well as the psychosocial, cultural, and 
ethical dimensions of clinical care decision making. Edmund D. Pellegrino, 
Commentary: Clinical Judgment, Scientific Data, and Ethics: Antidepressant 
Therapy in Adolescents and Children, 184 J. NERV. MENT. DIS. 106, 106-08 
(1996). These non-scientific components of decision-making must be 
recognized and rigorously addressed: Pellegrino writes that “Any model of 
clinical thinking that uses only the scientific paradigms is insufficient to 
encompass all things involved in clinical judgments.” Id. at 107. 
6 CRANOR, supra note 2, at 143. “The role of judgment is essential for 
the individual scientist (the expert) and (for the) consensus scientific 
committees (i.e. groups of experts).” He adds, “. . . there is an (almost) 
irreducible scientific judgment that enters into assessing scientific evidence 
and inferring that a substance causes a disease.” Id. at 152. 
7 R.A. Carpenter has described the necessary role for judgment in 
environmental risk assessment: “Judgment on both technical and nontechnical 
issues and on their interaction is (thus) required.” R.A. Carpenter, Scientific 
Information, Expert Judgment, and Political Decision Making, 18 J. OCCUP. 
MED. 295 (1976). 
8 “. . . [A]ll empirical investigation demands the same epistemic virtues: 
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Traditionally, however, many scientists and laypersons alike 
have held that, ideally, science should be free of judgment and 
its subjective influences, free to discover the causal laws that 
explain the world.9 
Nonetheless, no one has ever found a way to circumvent the 
need for judgment, perhaps because the systems studied by 
biomedical sciences offer no universal laws, or because no 
science can offer the proof (nor disproof) upon which 
mathematics thrives,10 much less a definitive algorithm for 
establishing causal relationships.11 Perhaps we cannot do without 
                                                          
respect for evidence, care and persistence in seeking it out, good judgment in 
assessing its worth . . . .” SUSAN HAACK, DEFENDING SCIENCE WITHIN 
REASON: BETWEEN SCIENTISM AND CYNICISM 167 (2003). 
9 Philip Kitcher calls this “Legend,” the idea that science is free of 
anything but rationality. He writes that there have been those who believe 
“science is a clearing of rationality in a jungle of muddle, prejudice, and 
superstition.” PHILIP KITCHER, THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE: SCIENCE 
WITHOUT LEGEND, OBJECTIVITY WITHOUT ILLUSION 3-4 (1995). 
10 The failure of scientific evidence to provide definitive proof (or 
disproof) is called “underdetermination.” Within many circles in the 
philosophy of science, it is the “most obvious” and “most troublesome” 
problem for science in the area of theory appraisal, i.e. deciding which 
theory gives the best explanation for the available evidence. E. McMullin, 
Underdetermination, 20 J. MED. PHILOS. 233, 241 (1995). At a more 
practical level, such as the testing of hypotheses about disease causation in 
population-based studies, underdetermination is a constant companion of the 
epidemiologist. “Typically, scientific evidence underdetermines the 
hypotheses tested in (epidemiologic) research studies, providing neither proof 
nor disproof.” D.L. Weed, Underdetermination and Incommensurability in 
Contemporary Epidemiology, 7 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 107 (1997). 
11 Most commentators agree that there is no decisive algorithm—i.e. no 
methodology—for establishing causation that avoids the need for judgment. 
E.g., Susser, CASUAL THINKING, supra note 4, at 140. “. . . [T]here are no 
absolute rules (for causal inference). . . .” See also J. Doull, K. K. Rozman, 
& M. C. Lowe, Hazard Evaluation in Risk Assessment: Whatever Happened 
to Sound Scientific Judgment and Weight of Evidence? 28 DRUG METAB. REV 
285, 291 (1996) (“It has long been recognized that there are relatively few 
absolutes in biology, and that any interpretation of observed phenomena must 
be tempered by sound scientific judgment.”) Wandall notes that the process 
of accepting a (causal) hypothesis on the basis of evidence has no 
accompanying algorithm nor decision rule and therefore must rely upon value 
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judgment because it provides us with a way to finish off the 
essential scientific puzzle:12 laying claim to the causal 
relationships that connect the physical “real” world with our 
perceptions of that world.13 Neither carefully crafted 
observations nor the accuracy of causal hypotheses are sufficient 
for this purpose. We need something else to help us decide what 
those causal relationships are. We need judgment. 
Expert judgment is inescapable and is as important as all that 
which surrounds science, feeds it, and feeds upon it: the funding 
and politics, the professional societies and journals, the 
universities, corporations, and the research institutions. It is as 
much a part of science as the theories, hypotheses, 
methodologies, and evidence. Judgment is an integral part of the 
history of science, its ethic, and its philosophy. In short, science 
would not be science without judgment. 
                                                          
judgment, including epistemic (instrumental-goal-oriented) values. Birgitte 
Wandall, Values in Science and Risk Assessment, 152 TOXICOL. LETT. 265, 
267 (2004). See also Green, Freedman & Gordis, supra note 2, at 375 
(“There is no formula or algorithm that can be used to assess whether a 
causal inference is appropriate based on these (causal) guidelines.”) Susan 
Haack expresses this idea as follows: “When something requires judgment, it 
can’t be formalized into rules or some kind of decision-procedure that can be 
followed mechanically.” E-mail to author from Susan Haack, July 5, 2006. 
12 Thomas Kuhn links scientific problem-solving with puzzles in an 
immensely influential book. THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC 
REVOLUTIONS 36-39 (3rd ed. 1996). 
13 The idea that science involves the interconnections of distinct 
“worlds” is attributed to the philosopher Karl Popper, whose theory of 
scientific method is laced with falsifications. Interestingly enough, the 
Supreme Court cited his theory in their landmark Daubert decision. Daubert 
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993). See D. 
Goodstein, How Science Works in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC 
EVIDENCE, Federal Judicial Center 67-82 (2000); Susan Haack, Trial and 
Error: The Supreme Court’s Philosophy of Science, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 
S66, S66-S73 (2005). Popper proposed that the practice of science is 
comprised of three different worlds: that of physical states, another of our 
perceptions and observations of that physical world, and a third world of 
ideas. In Popper’s third world lie theories, hypotheses, and causal 
explanations. KARL POPPER, OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE: AN EVOLUTIONARY 
APPROACH 154-56 (rev. ed., 1981). 
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That said, scientific judgment is not easy to define, although 
we are fairly clear about the kind of judgment we prefer: good, 
sound, and unbiased.14 We are much better, in fact, at 
describing the biases that affect judgment than we are at defining 
judgment itself. Overconfidence, anchoring, availability bias, 
conflicts of interest, mindsets and ideologies, and “wish” bias 
are commonly cited,15 any of which may shift a particular 
expert’s judgment from “unbiased” to “biased.” Although this 
shift does not necessarily signal an accompanying shift from 
                                                          
14 See SUSAN HAACK, DEFENDING SCIENCE WITHIN REASON: BETWEEN 
SCIENTISM AND CYNICISM 167 (2003) for a definition of “good judgment.” 
Haack has also described “shrewd judgment.” Susan Haack, An 
Epistemologist Among the Epidemiologists, 15 EPIDEMIOL. 522 (2004). See 
also Doull et al., supra note 11, at 291. “It has long been recognized that 
there are relatively few absolutes in biology, and that any interpretation of 
observed phenomena must be tempered by sound judgment.” (emphasis 
added). For a discussion of the biases that can affect scientific judgment, see 
infra note 15. See also OTWAY & VON WINTERFELDT, supra note 3. 
15 See id. They describe a wide range of biases that can affect the 
process of expert judgment: mindsets and ideologies that spring from shared 
experiences and the conventional wisdom of a scientific discipline, cognitive 
biases such as overconfidence, anchoring, and availability bias, motivational 
biases that track closely with conflicts of interest, and mindsets and 
ideologies reflecting their respective scientific communities. Overconfidence 
is the tendency for experts to be more certain about probability estimates than 
their knowledge can justify. Anchoring occurs when an expert holds to his 
original estimate and fails to adjust it sufficiently as new or disconfirming 
evidence accumulates. Availability is a cognitive bias in which there is a 
tendency to base judgments on readily recalled information rather than the 
full body of available information. E.L. Wynder, I.T. Higgins & R.E. 
Harris, The Wish Bias, 43 J. CLIN. EPIDEMIOL. 619, 619-21 (1990) is an 
interesting example of a bias that can directly affect a scientist’s claims about 
disease causation: it occurs in those situations wherein the scientist has 
published a study on a particular exposure-disease relationship and then 
writes a review of the literature within which a causal claim is made about 
that same relationship. Such a claim can be biased if the investigator is 
influenced in their overall conclusion regarding causation by the direction of 
the results of their own study, in either direction, positive or null. The 
opportunity for “wish” bias is particularly prominent because typically those 
scientists reviewing the literature have previously published studies on the 
topic. See Weed, supra note 10, at 107. 
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“sound” to “unsound” or from “good” to “bad,” we often 
regard it as suspect, and rightly so. The fact that biases can 
affect one’s judgment suggests that judgment can be improved 
upon by learning to recognize and avoid the many sources of 
bias. 
Some argue that groups of experts, who may better 
recognize individual biases, should make decisions about 
causation, thereby circumventing biased conclusions.16 However, 
expert groups are not in fact protected from bias; mindsets and 
ideologies can be important sources of bias that arise from 
within a scientific community, representing the common and 
conventional wisdom of the discipline shared by its many 
members.17 For example, epidemiologists may discount the need 
for fully understanding the biological mechanism of a purported 
causal relationship because they follow a popular disciplinary 
maxim (or, rule-of-thumb) that the biological plausibility of a 
causal association—and so the extent to which its mechanism can 
be known—depends upon the biological knowledge of the day.18 
                                                          
16 Daniel Gilbert opines that it is often easier to see bias in the decisions 
of others than in one’s own decisions. He writes: “Research suggests that 
decision-makers don’t realize how easily and often their objectivity is 
compromised . . . Much of what happens in the brain is not evident to the 
brain itself.” Daniel Gilbert, I’m O.K., You’re Biased, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 
2006, at A12. On the other hand, Gilbert also notes that we tend to 
overestimate and exaggerate the effects of bias on others’ judgments. 
“Research shows that while people underestimate the influence of self-interest 
on their own judgments and decisions, they overestimate its influence on 
others.” Id. 
17 See OTWAY & VON WINTERFELDT, supra note 3, at 91, for a 
discussion of mindsets and ideologies as sources of bias. 
18 Weed and Hursting have examined the rules of evidence aligned with 
the so-called criterion of “biological plausibility” in the practice of causal 
inference in epidemiology. D.L. Weed & S.D. Hursting, Biologic Plausibility 
in Causal Inference: Current Method and Practice, 147 AM. J. EPIDEMIOL. 
415, 415-25 (1998). A popular and widely cited rule (of thumb) is that 
biological plausibility—one of Austin Bradford Hill’s original 1965 causal 
considerations—is dependent upon the knowledge of the day and therefore 
cannot be required. The growth of molecular biology and, in particular, 
molecular epidemiology, may change this widely accepted “mindset” in the 
future. Indeed, on the other side of this coin, there are others who place an 
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Such a low threshold for the mechanistic understanding of 
disease causation could bias groups (and, for that matter, 
individuals) toward making premature causal judgments.19 
One potential solution to this problem is to select scientists 
from many different disciplines to sit on panels formulating 
causal conclusions, as is commonly done by regulatory agencies 
and less commonly by the courts in toxic tort litigation.20 
Unfortunately, another bias may be introduced if members of 
one discipline discount the results of another because they 
believe those results to be generally unreliable. Epidemiology, 
with its emphasis on non-experimental, observational studies, is 
sometimes singled out in this way, as if it were the only science 
with “limits.”21 
Expert judgment, although not easily defined and subject to 
bias, appears to perform many different functions. It produces 
(or, more precisely, is required in the production of) 
conclusions,22 decisions,23 evaluations,24 inferences,25 
                                                          
exceedingly high threshold on evidence in support of biological plausibility; 
for them, causation cannot be claimed until the mechanism involved has been 
well established. Id. 
19 It can also be argued that lowering the threshold for making causal 
claims is a precautionary measure rather than a premature one. See D.L. 
Weed, Precaution, Prevention, and Public Health Ethics, 29 J. MED. PHILOS. 
313, 313-32 (2004). 
20 See W.W. Schwarzer & J.S. Cecil, Management of Expert Evidence, 
in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 59-63 (Federal Judicial 
Center, 2000), for a discussion of the legal authority and practical 
considerations, and for examples of court-appointed scientific experts. 
21 Epidemiologists are sometimes their own worst enemy on this 
particular issue. In a widely publicized news article in Science magazine, 
entitled “Epidemiology Faces its Limits,” prominent epidemiologists (who 
later claimed they were misrepresented) noted that “people don’t take us 
[epidemiologists] seriously,” that “we’re pushing the edge of what can be 
done with epidemiology” and that “epidemiology is stretched to its limits or 
beyond.” Gary Taubes, Epidemiology Faces its Limits, 269 SCIENCE 164, 
164-69 (1995). Furthermore, epidemiologists sometimes regard toxicology as 
subject to bias through vulnerable extrapolations across dosage levels and 
species. Cecil, personal communication, August 18, 2006. 
22 Carpenter, supra note 7, at 295, notes under the heading “Expert 
Judgment” that an advisory committee (is) convened to translate technical 
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uncertainties,26 and last, but not least—circularly and 
ambiguously enough—judgments.27 These “judgments” concern 
all kinds of causes and risks: estimating the risk of cancer from 
exposure to chloroform or radon in drinking water,28 
characterizing exposure to benzene,29 assessing the safety of a 
new bicycle crossing design,30 calculating the likelihood that 
                                                          
information into conclusions for public policy. 
23 “It is a widely accepted claim that scientific practice contains value 
judgments, i.e. decisions made on the basis of values.” Wandall, supra note 
11, at 265. 
24 “The evaluations of IARC Working Groups are scientific, qualitative 
judgments on the evidence for and against carcinogenicity provided by the 
available data.” World Health Organization, International Agency for 
Research on Cancer, IARC Monographs on the Evaluation of Carcinogenic 
Risks to Humans, Preamble, Lyon, 2006. See also Wandall, personal 
communication, June 13, 2006. “On a very general level, I would say that a 
judgment is a kind of evaluation . . . .” See also OTWAY & VON 
WINTERFELDT, supra note 3, at 84 (“Judgments are inferences or evaluations 
that go beyond obvious statements of fact, data, or the conventions of a 
discipline.”). 
25 See OTWAY & VON WINTERFELDT, supra note 3, at 84. 
26 “In some cases, scientific judgment is used by a Bayesian analysis to 
estimate (the) uncertainties.” D.J. Crawford-Brown & C.R. Cothern, A 
Bayesian Analysis or Scientific Judgment of Uncertainties in Estimating Risk 
Due to 222Rn in U.S. Public Drinking Water Supplies, 53 HEALTH PHYSICS 11 
(1987). 
27 MORRIS R. COHEN & ERNEST NAGEL, AN INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 
AND SCIENTIFIC METHOD 28 (1934) (“A judgment is an ambiguous term, 
sometimes denoting the mental act of judging and sometimes referring to that 
which is judged.”). 
28 See John S. Evans, et al., Use of Probabilistic Expert Judgment in 
Uncertainty Analysis of Carcinogenic Potency, 20 REG. TOX. AND 
PHARMACOL., 15, 15-36 (1994) (asking experts in cancer biology/toxicology, 
pharmacokinetics, and dose-response modeling to make judgments about 
carcinogenic potential). See also Crawford-Brown & Cothern, supra note 26. 
29 Katherine D. Walker, John S. Evans & David MacIntosh, Use of 
Expert Judgment in Exposure Assessment. Part I. Characterization of 
Personal Exposure to Benzene, 11 J. EXP. ANAL. ENVIRON. EPIDEMIOL. No. 
4, 308-22 (2001). 
30 See L. Leden, P. Garder & U. Pulkkinen, An Expert Judgment Model 
Applied to Estimating the Safety Effect of a Bicycle Facility, 32 ACCIDENT 
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medications cause adverse drug reactions,31 and attributing lung 
cancer mortality to individual risk factors.32 The International 
Agency for Research on Cancer has also employed its judgment 
to assess the carcinogenic potential of a list of chemicals now 
several hundred compounds long.33 
We should not be surprised by the pervasiveness, utility, and 
flexibility of judgment. It is, after all, a necessary component of 
scientific experts’ causal claims and should therefore be useful in 
all sorts of specific situations. Judgment is not unique to science 
and it finds its way into many other aspects of life. As the 
French philosopher, Michel de Montaigne, reminds us from 
many centuries ago: “Judgment is a utensil proper for all 
subjects and will have an oar in everything.”34 Value 
judgments,35 moral judgments,36 and the legal decisions—the 
                                                          
ANAL. PREV. 589, 589-99 (2000). 
31 See Yannick Arimone et al., Agreement of Expert Judgment in 
Causality Assessment of Adverse Drug Reactions, 3 EUR. J. CLIN. 
PHARMACOL. 61, 169-73 (2005). 
32 See Elizabeth A. Casman & M. Granger Morgan, Use of Expert 
Judgment to Bound Lung Cancer Risks, 39 ENVIRON. SCI. & TECH. 5911, 
5911-20 (2005). 
33 At present, the IARC has evaluated over 900 different chemical 
compounds (and other agents, including complex mixtures such as tobacco 
smoke) for carcinogenicity. See International Agency for Research on 
Cancer, http://www.iarc.fr/IARCPress/index.php (last visited Oct. 11, 2006). 
34 8 MICHEL DE MONTAIGNE, Of Democritus and Heraclitus, IN THE 
COMPLETE WORKS OF MICHEL DE MONTAIGNE 266, 266-68 (Donald M. 
Frame Trans.) (2003) New York: Alfred P Knopf. 
35 “It is a widely accepted claim that scientific practice contains value 
judgments.” Wandall, supra note 11, at 265. But value judgments are also 
made in moral philosophy and in applied science areas such as risk 
assessment and risk management. “. . .[I]n a specific situation (of risk 
assessment) one must make very specific value judgments about what is 
‘doing good’. . . .” Kristin Shrader-Frechette, Reductionist Approaches to 
Risk, in ACCEPTABLE EVIDENCE: SCIENCE AND VALUES IN RISK 
MANAGEMENT 243 (D.G. Mayo & R.D. Hollander, eds., 1991). 
36 For a discussion of the relationships between causal judgments and 
moral judgments (about wrongful behaviors), see J. KNOBE & B. FRASER, 
CAUSAL JUDGMENT AND MORAL JUDGMENT: TWO EXPERIMENTS 
(forthcoming). 
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judgments—of judges are obvious and not necessarily mutually 
exclusive examples.37 
By recognizing the universal applicability of judgment are 
we really any closer to understanding its nature? What exactly is 
judgment? Is scientific judgment uniquely scientific? Or, is there 
something called judgment that can be applied equally well to 
science, to law, and to policy decisions? Finally, is judgment 
always subjective and so devoid of any claim to objectivity? To 
shed some light on answers to these questions, it will prove 
helpful to turn to two very different sources: one theoretical, the 
other empirical. I begin with judgment in philosophy, followed 
by empirical studies of expert (scientific) judgment. 
I.  JUDGMENT IN PHILOSOPHY 
Judgment can be found in many philosophical contexts, but 
those most pertinent to this discussion are: its role in scientific 
explanation, its role in medical decision making (seen through 
the reflective lens of Edmund Pellegrino, physician and 
philosopher), the characterization of judgment as a virtue, and 
finally, the relationship of judgment to values. This section will 
offer a briefly describe some of the philosophical contexts which 
evoke and define the use and purpose of judgment and its 
connection to different disciplines. 
A. Judgment and Scientific Explanation 
The aim of science is explanation, typically a causal 
explanation that arises from the scientific method, or more 
                                                          
37 For a discussion of the biases that can affect the judiciary, see 
Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Judging by Heuristic: Cognitive Illusions in 
Judicial Decision Making, 86 JUDICATURE 44 (2002), who note that “the 
institutional legitimacy of the judiciary depends upon the quality of the 
judgments that judges make.” Jasanoff points out that in a post-Daubert 
world, judges must not only make legal judgments but also scientific 
judgments about the relevance and reliability of scientific evidence. Sheila 
Jasanoff, Law’s Knowledge: Science for Justice in Legal Settings, 95 AM. J. 
PUB. HEALTH S49-S58 (2005). 
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generally, from scientific inquiry.38 To be useful, judgment must 
serve this aim. Haack nicely captures the link between judgment 
and explanation in the context of scientific inquiry: 
They (the scientists) need imagination to think up 
plausible potential explanations of problematic 
phenomena, to devise ways to get the evidence they 
need, and to figure out potential sources of error. 
They need care, skill, and persistence, and 
intellectual honesty, the moral fibre to resist the 
temptation to stay out of the way of evidence that 
might undermine their conjectures; and good 
judgment in assessing the weight of the evidence, 
unclouded by wishes or fears or hopes of getting 
tenure or resolving a case quickly or pleasing a 
patron or mentor or becoming rich and famous.39 
At first glance, judgment appears to be a distinct mental 
facility utilized near the end of the inquiry, from which the best 
scientific explanation of a phenomenon emerges. Science has no 
monopoly on this approach to inquiry and to the arrangement 
between judgment and explanation. Anyone who considers 
herself an “empirical inquirer,” including journalists and 
historians as well as scientists of all stripes, has a similar 
strategy. A general model of empirical inquiry involves 
informed conjectures, contrasts of conjecture with the relevant 
evidence, and the application of judgment to help decide whether 
any given conjecture should be kept as the best explanation, or 
                                                          
38 The general aim of biomedical science is explanation in terms of 
causal relationships. Indeed, Lipton argues that all scientific explanations are 
causal explanations: “To explain a phenomenon is to give an account of its 
causal history.” PETER LIPTON, INFERENCE TO THE BEST EXPLANATION 30 
(2nd ed., 2004). Karl Popper notes that “. . . it is the aim of science to find 
satisfactory explanations or whatever strikes us as being in need of 
explanation.” He also aligns scientific explanation with causal explanation. 
KARL POPPER, OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE: AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH 191 
(rev. ed., 1981). 
39 See SUSAN HAACK, DEFENDING SCIENCE WITHIN REASON: BETWEEN 
SCIENTISM AND CYNICISM 97 (2003) (emphasis added). 
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whether it should be dropped or modified.40 Nevertheless, the 
scientific inquiry associated with disease causation (as carried 
out in the biomedical sciences) conforms well to this model, a 
model rich in conjectures, evidence, explanations, and the 
various forms of reasoning that can connect these together: 
inductive, deductive, retroductive, hypothetico-deductive, 
Bayesian, and “inference to the best explanation,” to name a 
few.41 
Scientific reasoning is also not enough to accomplish the 
work of science. Ethical reasoning (whether in the form of 
principles, rules, or the maxims of case-based ‘casuistic’ 
thinking) is also important, especially in studies involving human 
subjects, where requirements for informed consent, 
confidentiality, and avoiding harm determine how and even 
whether studies can be carried out.42 All science lives in the 
shadow of scientific misconduct and its menacing instigator, the 
“fame and fortune viper,” whose fangs can be avoided by 
promoting professional virtues (Haack’s “moral fibre”) and by 
recognizing that values can influence the practice of science in 
powerful ways (Haack’s fears, hopes, and wishful thinking).43 
                                                          
40 Id. 
41 Scientific reasoning is as much about the past as the present and 
future; within it can be found the background knowledge and experience that 
a scientist brings to the process of inquiry as well as the methods of research 
synthesis that summarize and aid in the interpretation of scientific evidence. 
42 For general treatments of the role of ethics in biomedical research—
i.e. bioethics—see the classic text on the principles of biomedical ethics, 
BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS (4th ed., 
1994). See also the interesting and somewhat controversial discussion of case-
based ethical reasoning—casuistry—in JONSEN & TOULMIN, THE ABUSE OF 
CASUISTRY: A HISTORY OF MORAL REASONING (1988). For a general 
discussion of the application of bioethics to a specific health science 
discipline, namely epidemiology, see COUGHLIN & BEAUCHAMP, ETHICS AND 
EPIDEMIOLOGY (1996). 
43 There is no quick fix for preventing scientific misconduct. D.L. 
Weed, Preventing Scientific Misconduct, 88 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, 125, 125-
29 (1998). It can be a huge burden on the prestige and public perception of 
any science, although it has a particularly devastating effect on biomedical 
science, where individual patients’ lives and, more generally, the public’s 
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What is not yet clear, however, is the extent to which 
judgment plays a role in all these components of scientific 
inquiry or, alternatively, whether it can be separated out, to be 
brought into the process near the end. On the one hand, it seems 
reasonable for judgment to be involved in formulating 
hypotheses and analyzing data from the start, long before a 
decision regarding causation is attempted.44 For is it not the case 
that a new hypothesis might emerge from a careful 
consideration—a judgment—of the lack of evidence?45 There are 
also the value judgments and moral judgments that affect the 
practice of science all along its journey from one explanation or 
paradigm to another.46 On the other hand, it is also reasonable 
to place judgment near the end of a causal inquiry as a separate 
and distinct facility applied to the heavily metaphorical notion of 
the “weight of evidence.”47 For is it not also the case that once 
reasoning has been applied to the available evidence, values 
identified and biases avoided, the expert then puts it all together 
                                                          
health lies in the balance. See Jerome P. Kassirer, The Frustrations of 
Scientific Misconduct, 328 New Eng. J. Med., 1634, 1634-36 (1993). 
44 See supra note 1 for a further discussion. 
45 The philosopher Michael Polanyi is probably best known for his 
comprehensive look at the influential role of the individual scientist in the 
process of science. “. . . [I]nto every act of knowing there enters a tacit and 
passionate contribution of the person knowing what is known. This personal 
coefficient is no mere imperfection but a necessary component of all 
knowledge.” MICHAEL POLANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE: TOWARDS A POST-
CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY 312 (1958). See also Karori Mbugua, Michael Polanyi 
and the Personal Element in Science, 17 SOUTH AFR. J. PHIL. 152, 152-60 
(1998). 
46 See Wandall, supra note 11, at 265. 
47 “Weight of evidence” is almost as popular a concept in the biomedical 
science literature as “judgment.” Indeed, they often appear together, 
especially in the areas of causal inference and risk assessment. “Weight of 
evidence” is a particularly vague concept that typically appears in solely a 
metaphorical sense, without pointing to any specific methodology of 
interpreting evidence, much less a qualitative or quantitative weighting 
scheme. Douglas L. Weed, Weight of Evidence: A Review of Concept and 
Methods, 25 RISK ANALYSIS 1545, 1545-57 (2005); Sheldon Krimsky, The 
Weight of Scientific Evidence in Policy and Law, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, 
S129-36 (2005). 
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and makes her final judgment? The exact nature of judgment, 
then, remains elusive. 
B.  Judgment in Science-Based Clinical Medical Decisions 
Pellegrino, the physician-philosopher, appreciates the 
complex nature of judgment as it is used in the practice of 
evidence-based medicine. A clinical judgment, in his view, is 
the decision regarding the best course of action for a patient, a 
decision that combines science with ethical norms, the virtues 
and the values of physician and patient alike.48 
Virtues are particularly important and Pellegrino promotes 
both the intellectual virtues of excellence, objectivity, and 
practical wisdom with the moral virtues of benevolence, 
honesty, and self-effacement. He puts great stock in prudence, 
the “capstone” virtue, linking the intellectual, truth-bearing, 
virtues with the moral, good-seeking, virtues. Prudence connects 
medical science with medical practice and serves both the 
explanatory aim of science and the beneficent aim of medicine. 
Virtue, then, supports the professional practice of evidence-
based medicine along with the familiar bioethical principles—
non-malfeasance, beneficence, respect for persons, and justice—
and all that science itself has to offer each clinical judgment.49 
C.  Judgment as Practical Wisdom 
Judgment can be narrowly aligned with a specific virtue, one 
of the many character traits that assist us in doing our work—in 
this case, our scientific work—well. Some see judgment as 
practical wisdom, an Aristotelian virtue.50 Good judgment, in 
                                                          
48 See Pellegrino, supra note 5, at 106-08. 
49 See EDMUND PELLEGRINO & DAVID THOMASMA, THE VIRTUES IN 
MEDICAL PRACTICE (Oxford University Press 1993). 
50 “. . . [J]udgment (is) essentially the faculty Aristotle described as 
practical wisdom, which reveals itself over time in individual decision rather 
than in the enunciation of general principles.” THOMAS NAGEL, The 
Fragmentation of Value, in PHILOSOPHICAL ETHICS 50 (T. Beauchamp, ed., 
McGraw-Hill 1982). 
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this view, reveals itself in individual decisions in the same way 
that any virtue—excellence, objectivity, honesty, or prudence—
reveals itself in the actions and decisions of those in possession 
of a good, virtuous, character. Scientific judgment, then, can be 
considered an epistemic virtue, serving the explanatory aim of 
science.51 
A virtue, it should be noted, is more an attribute of character 
than an attribute of action. Put another way, a virtue is a 
disposition rather than a skill or a technique. It disposes us—
motivates us—to do our work well.52 As the virtue of practical 
wisdom, therefore, judgment is an inherent tendency that 
motivates us to make a good decision about causation given the 
available evidence. It does not act independently of the other 
components of such a decision, including other virtues, but in 
concert with them. 
D.  Judgment and Values 
Up to this point, my characterization of judgment has run 
along two parallel yet shared tracks. Judgment can be a virtue, 
plain and not-so-simple, but it can also be considered a 
multidimensional mental capacity—a process—within which 
reasoning, virtues, and values operate on scientific evidence. 
Before sorting out this overlap, and to complete this brief 
philosophical snapshot of the nature of judgment, I turn to the 
role of values in scientific inquiry. 
Values and value judgments in science emerged from the 
postmodern, largely historical, view of scientific progress in the 
                                                          
51 SUSAN HAACK, DEFENDING SCIENCE WITH REASON: BETWEEN 
SCIENTISM AND CYNICISM 167 (Prometheus Books 2003). 
52 See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (2d ed. 1984) for a 
general account of virtues in ethical theory. See Pellegrino and Thomasma, 
supra note 5, for the role of virtues in medical practice. In general, “virtues 
are to be distinguished from skills and techniques. They are dispositions or 
tendencies and are valued differently. Errors in technique are expected (i.e. 
the honest mistake); greater reservations arise when judgments suggest a lack 
of personal integrity.” Douglas Weed and Robert McKeown, Epidemiology 
and Virtue Ethics, 27 INT’L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 344 (1998). 
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mid-twentieth century,53 with intellectual roots deep in American 
pragmatism.54 They come in two basic varieties: epistemic (or 
constitutive) values with origins in an objective tradition, and 
another, sometimes called contextual values, with origins in a 
subjective or humanistic tradition.55 The constitutive values are 
those criteria, for example, that characterize a good scientific 
theory. These assist scientists in selecting one theory or 
hypothesis over another. Thomas Kuhn’s list of epistemic values 
includes: accuracy, consistency, scope, fruitfulness, and 
simplicity.56 From Popper’s philosophy we could add 
predictability, testability (or refutability), and explanatory 
power.57 
The epidemiologists, interestingly, have their own list of 
discipline-specific constitutive values—so-called causal “criteria” 
that assist them in distinguishing causal relationships from 
                                                          
53 THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 
(University of Chicago Press 3d ed. 1996) (1962), is generally regarded as 
the most important contemporary source of the notion that values play a 
critical role in scientific progress. 
54 Two giants in American pragmatism were Charles Peirce and John 
Dewey. Judgment featured prominently in their respective works. “A 
judgment is the mental act by which the judger seeks to impress upon himself 
the truth of a proposition.” CHARLES S. PEIRCE, PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS 
OF PEIRCE 103 (Justus Buchler, ed., Dover Publications 1955). “Philosophy 
is inherently criticism . . . .a criticism of criticisms. Criticism is 
discriminating judgment . . .” INTELLIGENCE IN THE MODERN WORLD: JOHN 
DEWEY’S PHILOSOPHY 260 (Joseph Ratner, ed., Random House, Inc. 1939). 
55 See HELEN LONGINO, SCIENCE AS SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE: VALUES AND 
OBJECTIVITY IN SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY (Princeton University Press 1990). 
56 See THOMAS KUHN, Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice, 
in THE ESSENTIAL TENSION: SELECTED STUDIES IN SCIENTIFIC TRADITION 
AND CHANGE 321 (1979). 
57 Popper’s philosophy is often described in terms of his signature 
concepts of refutability (the methodological equivalent of falsifiability) and 
testability. He also emphasized how increasing the falsifiability of a 
hypothesis in turn increases its explanatory power. “A theory is the bolder 
the greater its content. It is also the riskier: it is the more probable to state 
that it will be false.” POPPER, 53 THE TWO FACES OF COMMON SENSE 32-
105 in OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE (rev. ed. Clarion Press, 1981). 
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statistical associations.58 These include: consistency, strength, 
gradient (dose-response), experimentation, plausibility, 
coherence, temporality, specificity, and analogy.59 Investigators 
using these criteria (or guidelines) in an assessment of evidence 
have many choices to make: which evidence to select, how to 
prioritize them, and what rule of inference they will assign to 
each so-called “criterion” to signify what it will take for the 
available evidence to satisfy that particular criterion.60 
For example, in cancer epidemiology, investigators typically 
emphasize consistency (the extent to which published, peer-
reviewed, studies have similar results), strength (the quantitative 
magnitude of the observed relationship between exposure and 
disease outcome as measured in a study population), and 
biologic plausibility (the extent to which the biological 
mechanism is known).61 These, in turn, reflect general scientific 
principles (or maxims) that play an important role in scientific 
reasoning.62 Consistency of findings in the face of repeated (and 
                                                          
58 Causal inference has been discussed in epidemiology for decades and 
is most often described in terms of “criteria” which are also called 
“considerations” or “guidelines.” 
59 The British medical statistician, Austin Bradford Hill, published a 
now-classic article setting forth nine causal considerations (now most often 
called “criteria”). Austin Bradford Hill, The Environment and Disease: 
Association or Causation? 58 PROC. ROY. SOC. MED. 295 (1965). 
60 For a discussion of the value-laden nature of Hill’s criteria, see Weed, 
supra note 9. 
61 The use of causal criteria in epidemiology typically occurs in 
published reviews of the scientific literature, textbook chapters, and editorials 
commenting upon the causal significance of a particularly important (new) 
study. In a systematic review of a series of these published reviews in cancer 
epidemiology, several patterns of usage were revealed: the most common 
criteria used in practice were: consistency, strength, and biologic plausibility. 
Other criteria were also employed, depending upon the particular approach of 
the investigators. See Weed & Gorelic, supra note 4. 
62 The causal criteria of epidemiology used by many public health and 
medical disciplines were developed in the mid-20th Century without much 
explicit attention to their theoretical roots. More recently, these criteria have 
been linked to more general scientific principles, including testability and 
predictability. See CAUSAL INFERENCE 15-32 (Kenneth J. Rothman, ed., 
1988); Douglas Weed, Methods in Epidemiology and Public Health: Does 
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more stringent) tests reflects the principle of testability. Strong 
associations typically mean that alternative explanations—
confounders—are less likely. And the existence of a well-
evidenced biological mechanism may permit better predictions of 
future effects. 
Aligning constitutive (scientific) values with general 
scientific precepts and principles such as quantitation, testability, 
and predictability, suggests that it is incorrect to necessarily 
align values with subjectivity. Since “epistemic” values play 
such an important—indeed, key—role in scientific reasoning, it 
follows that scientific judgment, inasmuch as it is part reasoning 
and part values, has some claim to objectivity. In other words, 
calling expert judgment “subjective,” without qualification, is 
misleading at best, inappropriate at worst.63 
Contextual or subjective values also play an important role in 
scientific inquiry. These arise from many sources: psychology, 
social and cultural forces, politics, and ethics. They affect many 
parts of the scientific endeavor, including but not limited to the 
choice of research topic as well as the interpretation of 
evidence.64 An interesting example can be found in 
epidemiological literature, in which an academic scientist (with 
strong but undisclosed anti-abortion views) published a review of 
the scientific evidence on the topic of the potential relationship 
between induced abortion and breast cancer, concluding that the 
causal association was responsible for thousands of breast cancer 
deaths each year and characterizing it as a public health 
tragedy.65 This scientist later admitted in a published newspaper 
                                                          
Practice Match Theory?, 55 J. OF EPIDEMIOLOGY AND COMMUNITY HEALTH 
104-10 (2001). 
63 See Y. Arimone, B. Begaud, G. Miremont-Salame, A. Fourrier-
Reglat, M. Molimard, N. Moore & F. Haramburu, A New Method for 
Assessing Drug Causation Provided Agreement with Experts’ Judgment, 59 J. 
OF CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 308-14 (2006). 
64 See Wandall, supra note 11, at 267. 
65 J. Brind, V.M. Chinchilli & W.B. Severs, et. al., Induced Abortion 
as an Independent Risk Factor for Breast Cancer: A Comprehensive Review 
and Meta-Analysis, 50 J. OF EPIDEMIOLOGY AND COMMUNITY HEALTH 481-
96 (1996). 
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interview that his conclusions had been colored by his moral 
values.66 It should be noted that other epidemiologists, 
examining the same evidence at the same time and using the 
same criteria of causation, concluded that not only was there no 
causal association, but more significantly, that there was no 
evidence of even a statistical association between induced 
abortion and breast cancer.67 
Values are vital and powerful players in scientific inquiry, 
with influence at both theoretical and practical levels. Some say 
that in the actual practice of making an expert (scientific) 
judgment of the available (weight of the) evidence, these 
objective and subjective value-laden traditions cannot be 
separated.68 In the end, an expert’s judgment is always at least 
one part fact and two parts value. 
E.  Four Types of Judgment 
Perhaps not surprisingly, this brief philosophical overview 
has both complicated matters and provided insights into the 
nature of judgment. A relatively simple model—that sound and 
unbiased judgment, applied to the scientific evidence, results in 
a causal assessment or claim—is probably insufficient. Either 
way it is vague, because it does not explicitly recognize that 
judgment can include scientific and ethical reasoning as well as 
values and virtues, or it is too narrow, because it assigns 
judgment to one of the virtues and ignores the role of reasoning, 
other virtues, and values in evidentiary judgments. 
Several different senses of the concept of judgment have 
been identified. It can be an outcome, as in the final causal 
judgment (or decision or claim) made by an individual scientist 
or group of scientists. Similarly, a physician’s decision to 
intervene on behalf of her patient is a clinical judgment. But 
judgment can also be the multidimensional mental capacity that 
                                                          
66 R.A. Knox, Bias in Abortion Study is Charged, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 
12, 1996, at A1. 
67 See Weed, supra note 10, at 111. 
68 See OTWAY & VON WINTERFELDT, supra note 3, at 84. 
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incorporates forms of reasoning, various values, and several 
virtues, and with which one produces an outcome—a judgment—
when confronted with evidence. Thirdly, judgment can be more 
narrowly framed as just one of the dimensions of this broader 
capacity: given the evidence, the scientist reasons, considers 
(when she can) the values that may guide or influence her 
conclusion, and then employs her judgment—that reflects her 
character—along the way. This third sense of judgment tracks 
most closely with the virtue of practical wisdom. 
There may also be room for one more type of judgment, 
which is X: as an irreducible, if not independent, component of 
the process not captured by reasoning, values nor virtues, and 
yet without which the final product—a decision regarding the 
existence (or not) of a well-evidenced causal explanation—cannot 
be completed. Perhaps this is just intuition or perhaps it is just 
common sense, although we should never forget Thoreau’s 
warning about this particularly ill-defined human capacity: “The 
commonest sense,” he wrote, “is the sense of men asleep, which 
they express by snoring.”69 
Separating out this irreducible and rather vague—“whatever 
remains”—version of judgment may be difficult. It may also be 
difficult to separate out any of the components of judgment in 
practice inasmuch as each intimately influences the other and 
likely operates simultaneously with all others. Practical wisdom, 
for example, helps us to reason well. Similarly, judgment (as the 
virtue of practical wisdom) is not only applied at or near the end 
of the process, but also during the initial phases of scientific 
inquiry when selecting which hypothesis to study, a decision that 
is also affected by scientific reasoning (which puzzles remain to 
be solved) and social values (which studies funding agencies will 
support given their respective research priorities). Practical 
wisdom will also come in handy, along with scientific reasoning, 
and the virtues of excellence, and objectivity, when deciding 
(i.e. judging) which studies are relevant, their validity, and their 
relative weights in an interpretative assessment of causation or 
risk. Finally, judgment—as a multidimensional capacity to make 
                                                          
69 H.D. THOREAU, WALDEN 287 (Alfred P. Knopf 1992). 
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a reliable decision in the face of evidence—aids in selecting 
which causal criteria (or other epistemic values) to employ or, 
alternatively, how to prioritize them, given the available 
evidence, a very good example of a type of a judgment that is 
part fact, part value; part objective, part subjective; part 
quantitative, part qualitative. 
We can conclude that a scientist’s judgment is applied to the 
evidence, both after and in parallel with the complex firing of all 
the neurons and mental pathways needed to reason scientifically, 
think ethically, and act in accordance with one’s character (i.e., 
with the virtues) and values, whether those values come from 
within or from outside the scientific community. Given all these 
factors, it is a complex mix indeed that characterizes an expert’s 
scientific judgment. 
II.  EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF EXPERT JUDGMENT 
Those who study expert judgment, recognizing the difficulty 
of pinning down a precise definition and appreciating its 
complex multidimensionality, have primarily examined the 
extent to which a carefully selected and small group of experts, 
when shown exactly the same information (i.e., the scientific 
evidence) and having been interviewed (and coached) by trained 
elicitators,70 can arrive at similar conclusions.71 These studies do 
                                                          
70 “Elicitators” are those trained in the study methodologies of eliciting 
(guiding) judgments. Facilitators would be a reasonable synonym. 
71 A systematic review of the state of the science of studying expert 
judgment is beyond the scope of this paper. Walker et al. include a brief 
history of this topic in their introduction to a study that elicited what they call 
“subjective judgment” regarding personal exposure to benzene in the absence 
of adequate amounts of relevant data. Katherine Walker et al., supra note 29, 
at 308-22. Note that the outcome of interest in this study is the extent to 
which a group of seven scientific experts can agree on the concentration of 
benzene individuals in a target population (being study separately) were 
exposed to at home, indoors, and in their ambient environment. These 
experts “exhibited striking differences in the degree of uncertainty expressed” 
despite being reasonably close in agreement about the mean (average) 
benzene exposure concentrations. Id. at 308. In another study by Evans et 
al., the investigators elicited statements regarding causality (carcinogenicity) 
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not examine the independent role of judgment so much as the 
end result of a process that involves the scientific evidence, 
whatever reasoning process and values and biases each 
individual expert brings to the table, and the interventions of the 
investigators, all of which may have some impact on whatever 
final judgments are made. In some studies, the experts’ 
individual judgments agree enough to be aggregated. In other 
studies, there are irresolvable differences. Both outcomes reflect 
what has been observed in another type of study—more 
descriptive—examining how experts in the everyday practice of 
causal inference have judged causation, given epidemiologic and 
toxicological evidence. In the practice of public health, for 
example, some reviewers of a body of epidemiologic and 
toxicologic evidence may claim causation, while others will not. 
Similarly, experts invited by the courts to examine scientific 
evidence can come to vastly different conclusions regarding 
general causation. 
In Soldo v. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals,72 for example, differing 
claims of causation regarding a medication’s capacity to cause 
stroke were partially explained by the fact that different 
scientific disciplines were involved. A neurologist and an 
epidemiologist were unconvinced about general causation; the 
pharmacologist, on the other hand, disagreed and made the 
causal claim.73 
                                                          
of chloroform in drinking water, given the available evidence, plus a formal 
(protocol-driven) elicitation process. In the words of the study authors, “risk 
distributions varied considerably between experts,” ranging from no risk to 
risks considered to be of regulatory significance. John Evans et al., Use of 
Probabilistic Expert Judgment in Uncertainty Analysis of Carcinogenic 
Potency, 20 REG. TOX. AND PHARMACOL 15, 15-36 (1994). In an elicitation 
study of the judgment of five lung cancer experts, on the other hand, all five 
agreed that cigarette smoking, residential radon, and environmental tobacco 
smoke were the major causes of lung cancer and that between 80 and 95 
percent of lung cancer deaths were due to cigarette smoking. Casman & 
Morgan, supra note 32, at 5914. 
72 Soldo v. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp., 244 F. Supp. 2d 434 (W.D. 
Pa., 2003). 
73 See Joe Cecil, Ten Years of Judicial Gatekeeping Under Daubert, 95 
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S74, S76-S78 (2005). 
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We can conclude, then, that in both concocted and real 
world scenarios, when experts are faced with exactly the same 
evidence, they may or may not disagree on its causal 
interpretation. 
A.  Disagreements about Causality 
Disagreement may not always be a problem for science 
because it can pave the way for scientific progress.74 Reasonable 
error-seeking resolution of scientific disagreements can stimulate 
progress at the “micro” level (when disagreements with the 
conclusions of a study give rise to a belief that a different, 
presumably better, study is warranted), and at the “meta” level 
(when disagreement with an assessment of the causal 
significance of a body of evidence gives rise to a belief that a 
new research program is needed to reveal the underlying 
mechanism). At the “macro” (paradigmatic) level, however, 
where the proponents of a new—even, revolutionary—theory do 
battle with those protecting the status quo, more research may 
not be the key to resolution. Paradigmatic shifts are more like 
religious conversions than rational exercises.75 Nevertheless, at 
the micro and meta levels, the resolution of the disagreement 
involves the familiar refrain, “more research is needed.” 
Scientific disagreement that is reasonable, in other words, can 
be resolved—or, more precisely, potentially resolved—with 
better studies, including improvements in the methods for 
interpreting those studies, the so-called methods of research 
synthesis.76 
                                                          
74 Haack, personal communication, July 5, 2006. The term 
“disagreement” as used here means the reasonable kind, where both sides of 
an issue employ “sound” judgment (not yet well-characterized) yet still 
cannot agree on the interpretation of the available evidence. The term 
“progress” means the replacement of one scientific problem-solution with 
another, typically achieved with more research designed to eliminate errors in 
earlier studies. See POPPER, supra note 13. 
75 See KUHN, supra note 12. 
76 See D. Weed, Evidence Synthesis and General Causation: Key 
Methods and an Assessment of Reliability, 54 Drake L. Rev. 639, 639-50 
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More research, of course, does not necessarily lead to less 
controversy. If new studies firm up the evidence on both sides 
of a disagreement, the controversy continues. Indeed, this 
phenomenon has been frequently observed for decades-long runs 
of epidemiologic studies, and it has been cited by the media (and 
occasionally by scientists) as strong evidence of a certain 
weakness of this inherently observational yet essential 
biomedical science.77 
B.  Does More Research Mean Less Judgment? 
It is commonly said that in the absence of sufficient scientific 
evidence, we must rely on the scientist’s (subjective) judgment.78 
But does it follow that as more evidence accumulates, there is 
less judgment employed? The answer to this question depends on 
the type of judgment under consideration. 
Recall the four senses of judgment described earlier,79 to 
which subscripts have been added for ease of presentation: 
judgment0, an outcome and the final result of judgment1; 
judgment1, the multidimensional mental capacity within which 
scientific and ethical reasoning operate along with the virtues 
and values; judgment2, the virtue of practical wisdom (and so a 
component of judgment1); and judgment3, a sense of the concept 
not captured by the others; intuitive, almost mystical, and 
commonly applied to the evidence at the end of the overall 
process of inquiry. 
As more evidence accumulates, the complexity of the final 
assessment regarding causation can only increase, requiring 
more judgment1 (and so, judgment2). Put another way, both these 
forms of judgment are needed at all steps along the journey 
undertaken in a systematic assessment of the available evidence 
                                                          
(2006). 
77 See supra note 21 for a further discussion. 
78 For a recent example, see Walker et al., supra note 29, at 308. 
“Frequently, however, data are neither abundant nor directly relevant, 
making it necessary to rely to varying degrees on subjective judgment.” Id. 
79 For a further discussion see supra Section E. 
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and so must increase along with the increase in the amount, 
kinds, and varying characteristics of the accumulating evidence, 
regardless of the results of that evidence. Only judgment3 could 
possibly shrink away as the evidence accumulates inasmuch as it 
is compatible with a rather naïve view of the relationship 
between evidence and judgment wherein a causal conclusion 
can, with enough strong and unequivocal evidence, be 
determined by that evidence, without the need for any 
“judgment” at all, as if to say that the evidence “proved” the 
hypothesis. Yet despite the popularity of the concept of “proof” 
among scientists, especially at conferences where randomized 
clinical trial results are presented, it is widely accepted that 
science has no such claim on determinism and that evidence 
always underdetermines the hypotheses being tested.80 We can 
presume, therefore, that the mystical, intuitive sense of judgment 
(judgment3) like its cousins, judgment1 and judgment2, will 
always be required in any causal interpretation of evidence. 
Perhaps it will fade as evidence accumulates, although there is 
no way to measure it. 
C.  Disagreements about Causality in the Courts and in the 
Regulatory Environment 
Disagreement about causation may be good for science, but 
it is a serious concern in the courts, due to the adversarial nature 
of the legal process, with (ideally) equally “expert” experts 
representing defendants’ and plaintiffs’ claims about the 
reliability and relevance of the scientific evidence as well as 
causal interpretation. Precisely the same situation exists within 
the regulatory context, where typically there are also two 
contrary views: one favoring looser standards and the other 
favoring stricter standards on some potentially hazardous 
material. 
There is no easy solution to this problem. There is no a 
priori reason why we should necessarily expect any two experts 
                                                          
80 See E. McMullin, Underdetermination, 20 J. MED. PHILOS. 233, 
233-52 (1995). See also, supra note 8. 
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to agree on the overall causal interpretation—having used their 
judgment—of the available evidence. The sheer complexity of 
causal assessments is one concern, reflected in the many 
theoretical, methodological, and practical choices available to 
causal decision makers. Another concern is the influence of 
virtues and values. Finally, we cannot forget the very real effect 
of various perspectives on causation that corresponds to 
membership in different scientific disciplines. 
The problem of disagreement is such a great concern for 
judges (especially, but not exclusively, in toxic tort litigation) 
and for policymakers (including public health and medical 
professionals) because they are charged with, and are therefore 
responsible for, decisions about what should be done “today”—
that is, without the luxury of waiting for additional scientific 
evidence. Something must be decided, at this Daubert hearing or 
at this clinic visit, at this regulatory hearing, or in the face of 
this outbreak of disease in this community.81 When faced with 
scientific disagreement, the fact finders in court or decision 
makers in other contexts must either interject their own version 
of the scientific state of affairs—like a tie-breaker—or they must 
find a way to determine that one or the other side of the 
disagreement is incorrect, or more likely so. In any case, this 
situation must involve an assessment of the soundness of 
others’—the experts’—judgment. 
III.  SOUND JUDGMENT 
If there were rules (or algorithms) for causal decisions, then 
an answer to the question, “What is sound judgment?” would be 
straightforward and involve following the rules. Unfortunately, 
no such algorithm exists and, to make matters more difficult, it 
                                                          
81 A central message of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 
516 U.S. 869 (1993) was the Supreme Court’s designation of the trial judge 
as the “evidentiary gatekeeper,” responsible for screening expert testimony to 
determine whether the relevancy and reliability requirements for scientific 
evidence are met. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DISCUSSION OF THE 
COMMITTEE ON DAUBERT STANDARDS: SUMMARY OF MEETINGS (National 
Academies Press 2006). 
WEED 3/3/2007  2:17 AM 
162 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
can be inferred from our earlier discussion that judgment 
(whether judgment1 or judgment2 or both) is important even in 
those situations in which algorithms (say, for statistical analysis) 
produce quantitative results; conclusions about causality do not 
leap out from the numbers, judgment is always required. 
So what constitutes “sound” judgment and can we 
distinguish it from “good” judgment and from “unbiased” 
judgment? As noted earlier, we generally prefer good, sound, 
and unbiased judgment in matters scientific. 
To say that someone has “good” judgment suggests that in 
both the short and long run, their decisions have proven to be 
well-regarded or, more often “right” than not, or some other 
such evaluative assessment that focuses on the outcome more so 
than the process through which the decision or outcome was 
produced.82 “Sound” judgment, in contrast, suggests that the 
process itself—the mental process that produced the outcome—
was exemplary in some way. “Good” judgment, therefore, 
primarily refers to judgment0, whereas “sound” judgment refers 
to judgment1. 
But it would probably be a mistake to suggest that 
“goodness” and “soundness” are not overlapping in meaning 
and importance. In these matters, outcome and process always 
go hand-in-hand. And so it seems reasonable to suggest that 
good outcomes could conceivably come from unsound judgment 
(perhaps because the process is infected with unsound reasoning, 
e.g., frank errors in scientific reasoning) and vice versa: that 
sound judgment could, in some instances, produce bad 
outcomes, given the complexity and unpredictability of real-life 
matters. 
How bias relates to the soundness and goodness of judgment 
is also important. An unbiased judgment is not necessarily 
sound; there are many other components, such as scientific 
                                                          
82 Section III is limited to judgment as outcome (judgment0) and to the 
multidimensional mental capacity (judgment1) within which the virtue of 
practical wisdom resides (i.e., judgment2). Section III does not address the 
problem of trying to determine if common sense or intuition (i.e., judgment3) 
can ever be unsound in the absence of a pathologic condition. 
WEED 3/3/2007  2:17 AM 
 NATURE & NECESSITY OF SCIENTIFIC JUDGMENT 163 
reasoning and ethical reasoning that could have gone astray. 
Likewise, a sound judgment may still be biased. There are many 
different forms of bias that cannot be easily identified, much less 
controlled. Bias, it seems, is unlikely to ever be completely 
extracted from (or missing in) the mental process of scientific 
judgment. After all, we are human beings, not reasoning 
machines. 
We may conclude that both good judgment and sound 
judgment are revealed in outcomes and reasoning processes that 
are relatively unbiased and that are rarely in error (that is, 
outcomes that are rarely made with frank errors in reasoning 
and are acceptable to others in the long run). Both good and 
sound judgment involves the open admission of values which 
play a role in the ultimate outcome. 
Who is qualified to make such an assessment; that is, who 
can judge the outcomes, and the judgment of experts, judges, 
and whoever else uses judgment in their professional practices? 
The answer is not immediately apparent. Nevertheless, it seems 
reasonable to think that some people’s judgment is better than 
others.83 
CONCLUSION 
This brief excursion into the nature of judgment has 
reaffirmed its necessity in causal thinking and has generated 
more questions than answers. At the top of the list is the 
problem of assessment: assessing the soundness of scientific 
judgment as a mental capacity or process (judgment1) as well as 
assessing the goodness of a judgment as outcome (judgment0). 
The latter is well known in the biomedical sciences; it is the 
problem of causation typically described in terms of the 
quantity, types, and characteristics of evidence needed to make a 
claim of disease causation. Perhaps it would be wise to add the 
various dimensions of judgment as mental capacity or process, 
for the two forms of judgment are intimately linked. The 
problem of assessing the soundness of judgment—how we think 
                                                          
83 Haack, personal communication, July 5, 2006. 
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about causation—also deserves much more attention from the 
philosophers, psychologists, and cognitive scientists who study 
such matters, and from those who, in their professional 
practices, are called upon to employ judgment in our courts and 
clinics, and in the area of public health. 
The many dimensions and components of scientific judgment 
give us some guidance on how it can be improved: by practicing 
our reasoning skills, building professional character, and by 
dutifully identifying the values that influence, even bias, our 
decisions and actions. Avoiding bias is always a good idea and 
always difficult to achieve. We must keep careful track not only 
of our causal decisions but also of the processes that result in 
those decisions. 
In the end, we find ourselves close to where we began: at 
the intersection of science, law, and policy, where so much 
complexity arises, where so many decisions of vital importance 
must be made, and where judgment matters most. 
 
